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A Synopsis of the D. C. Administrative
Procedure Act: As Applied to the City
Council and a Selected Agency
RONALD CHARLES GRIFFIN*
F OR some time, Washington residents have been without a uni-
form law which would guarantee them minimum administrative
due process before District agencies. In response to this need, Con-
gress enacted (to become effective in October, 1969) a District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.
To date, many legal practitioners are unfamiliar with the law.
With this in mind, this paper will try to explain it-showing how




Some time ago, a list of questions was circulated in the District
Government relative to the application of the District of Columbia
Administrative Procedure Act to the City Council. The principal
question on the list was "whether the City Council's legislative func-
tion could be so characterized as to put it beyond the scope of the
District's A.P.A.?" The answer, at present, is no. There are cases,
not yet reversed, which say that the City Government has no in-
herent authority to enact local laws independent of congressional limi-
tations.' The A.P.A. is a Congressional limitation upon the power
exercised by the Council.2 A fortiori, the Council must comply with
it.
B.S., Hampton Institute; J.D. Howard University. Member, District of
Columbia Bar.
1 District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S. 161, 171 (1897); United States
ex rel. Daly v. McFarland, 28 App. D.C. 552, 558 (1907); Fillippo v. Real Estate
Comm'n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268, 272-273 (D.C. App. 1966).
2 Because the Council is mentioned in several provisions of the Act, and be-
cause an ordinance can reasonably be construed as a statement by the Council
. .. "of general . .. applicability and future effect designed to implement or pre-
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The above answer is, of course, based upon what is known
about the City Council. Our inquiry commences with the acts abolish-
ing local self-Government' in the District and establishing a com-
mission form of Government in its place. 4 These acts and their legis-
lative histories are useful in that they give us a feel for what Congress
desired for the District of Columbia. A recurring question, found in
much of the Congressional debates, was the amount of self-gov-
erning power the new form of Government was to retain. The ques-
tion put to Congress was "whether we should restore to the citizens of
the District an elective franchise which would allow them, through
their city Government, to control local expenditures, legislation and
administrative affairs?"5  The ultimate answer was, of course, "no."
Much of Congress was of the view that, in light of past occurrences,
the commission form of Government was the best form for the Dis-
trict.' To some, Congress could do no higher duty than to create a
municipal Government which lacked legislative powers. 7 What they
envisioned were three Commissioners-officers presiding over a mu-
nicipal corporation-charged with the duty of executing laws enacted
by Congress for the District of Columbia."
This characterization of the District Government was adopted
by Congress and prevailed until 1887. In that year, Congress con-
ferred a police power, with limitations, upon the Commissioners.9
This power was later broadened when Congress in 1892 invested the
Commissioners with authority to enact police regulations to protect
the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of persons residing in the
District.'" The legislative history behind this Act is unclear as to
what Congress intended to restore to the District's Government."
Events suggest, however, that Congress's actions were tantamount to
restoring a species of legislative authority necessary for the preserva-
scribe law," 1 D.C. CODE 1502(b) (Supp. III 1970), the term "Rule" found in sub-
section 6 can be read to cover the ordinance enacting function of the Council.
3 18 Stat. 116 (1874).
4 20 Stat. 102 (1878).
5 7 CoNo. REC. 2115, 2120, 3244, 3247 (1878).
6 7 CONG. REC. 1922, 1924 (1878).
7 7 CONG. REc. 2120, 3213, 3747 (1878).
8 7 CONG. REc. 2532, 3213 (1878). District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S.
161, 176 (1897).
9 1 D.C. CODE §§ 224 (1967).
10 1 D.C. CODE §§ 226 (1967).
11 23 CONG. REC. 1132, 1229, 1328, 1471 (1892), S. Rep. No. 283, 52d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1892).
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tion of public order.1 2  There were no restrictions, other than the
plain terms of the statute, as to how and over what the Commis-
sioner's authority was to be exercised.
It is equally clear, however, that the Government, through its
Commissioners, was not given unlimited authority to make local
law.1" To this day, nothing has changed.
One might have thought, after examining the Reorganization Act
of 1949,1" Reorganization Plans 3 and 5,11 that these bits of legisla-
tion changed the Government by releasing it from its police power re-
strictions. These measures, of course, did not do so. The Act of
1948 simply differentiated the District Government from other Fed-
eral agencies, by citing it apart from other Federal agencies,1" thereby
implying that it was not an entity within the executive branch of the
Federal Government.1
The importance of the Act lies in the authority it conferred upon
the President to reorganize the District Government short of chang-
ing its basic ingredients.'8 This legislation is the foundation for the
present Reorganization Plan under which the City Government op-
erates.' 9
President Lyndon B. Johnson, when he submitted Plan 3, well
stated its objectives and its limitations: the plan would not change
the corporate status of the District of Columbia nor minimize the
powers of Congress over it.2° The plan would, and did, redistribute
administrative and legislative functions between a single commis-
sioner and a nine-man council. 2'
12 Coughlin v. District of Columbia, 25 App. D.C. 251, 254-255 (1905).
13 Id.
14 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-913 (1967).
15 1 D.C. CODE, ADMIN ISTRATION, APPENDIX, § 37 (Supp. III 1970). 1 D.C.
CODE ADMINISTRATION, APPENDIX, § 103 (1967).
16 5 U.S.C. § 905(a)(6) (1967).
17 § 905(a)(6). The 1949 Reorganization Act provides that "* * * no
reorganization plan shall provide for, and no reorganization under this act shall
have the effect of * * * [tiransferring to or consolidating with any other agency
the Municipal Government for the District of Columbia or all of those functions
thereof which are subject to this act, or abolishing said Government or all of said
functions." § 902 says, however, that the Municipal Government for the District
of Columbia is subject to Reorganization. See Senate Committee on Government
Organizations, Staff Memorandum No. 90-1-37, 7-8 (June 1967). Note, District of
Columbia Government Under Reorganization Plan 3 of 1967: :A Survey of Effects
and Problems, 17 AM. U.L. REV. 213-215 (1968).
18 ld.
19 1 D.C. CODE, ADMINISTRATION, APPENDIX, § 37 (Supp. III 1970).
20 H.R. Doc. No. 132, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. VI (1967).
21 Id. at IV.
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In summary, taking into account our discussion of the various
acts related to and cases characterizing the District of Columbia Gov-
ernment, it appears that the City Council inherited limited authority,
via the old Board of Commissioners, to make local regulations. In
no event did Congress confer or the Council inherit sweeping au-
thority to make local law.
How, does the A.P.A. apply to the functions carried out by
the City Council? More specifically, must the City Council comply
with 6(a) and other sections of the Act, before its police regulations
can become law? Section 6 (a) provides:1
2
The Commissioner and Council and each independent
agency shall, prior to the adoption of any rule or the amendment
or repeal thereof, publish in the District of Columbia Register
(unless all persons subject thereto named and either personally
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordanc with
law) notice of the intended action so as to afford interested per-
sons opportunity to submit data and views either orally or in
writing, as may be specified in such notice. The publication or
service required by this subsection of any notice shall be made
not less than thirty days prior to the effective date of the pro-
posed adoption, amendment, or repeal, as the case may be, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the Commissioner or Council or
the agency upon good cause found and published with the
notice.
As always, a statute must be examined as a whole in order to
discover the meaning of its constituent parts.2 3 A guiding principle
in this area has been that a statute, whose terms are clear and unam-
biguous, is the best evidence of what the legislature intended.
24  If
on the other hand, after a reading of the statute, its meaning appears
obscure, the law permits one to go beyond the statutory language to
find the legislative intent.2 5
With regard to the District of Columbia, the statutory language
indicates that Congress wanted to establish an administrative pro-
cedure for the District of Columbia Government. 26  With respect to
22 1 D.C. CODE § 1505(a) (Supp. III 1970).
22 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F.2d 531, 541
n.7, rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955). CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION, § 165 (1940).
24 Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
25 id.
26 1 D.C. CODE §§ 1501-1510 (Supp. III 1970).
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Section 6(a), that means that Congress was of a mind to have the City
Council comply with the above section before Council regulations
could become law.
Arguably, if this is so, Congress's intention undermines the rela-
tively broad authority of the Council to enact local regulations."
The original draft of the Act 8 and comments upon it 29 indicate that
Congress wanted the Act to apply to administrative agencies. The
City Council is not an administrative agency, in the ordinary sense,
for it performs the legislative function of the city."0 Because of this
fact, some argue, bearing in mind what the A.P.A. applies to, the
District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act does not and can-
not apply to the City Council.
The above argument, if we accept the premise "that the City
Council's sole function is legislative," is unassailable. This premise,
however, does not stand up under argument. When evidence is sub-
mitted showing (1) that the Council inherited many administrative
functions besides"1 and (2) that the act itself talks about the Council, 2
a conclusion other than the one reached above is warranted.
A part of the process for enacting a municipal regulation is an
administrative practice which accompanies the regulation from the
moment conceived through to the time it becomes law. It is to this
practice which the A.P.A. applies.
In view of the above, taking into account the legislative intent
27 District of Columbia v. Thompson, 347 U.S. 100, 111 (1952); Fillippo v.
Real Estate Comm'n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 556, 559 (D.C.
App. 1969). For other cases on the regulatory authority inherited by the Council,
see: R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 10 App. D.C. 111, 125 (1897); Taylor v.
District of Columbia, 24 App. D.C. 392, 396 (1904); Siddon v. Edmonston, 42
App. D.C. 459, 564 (1914).
If the legislative power of the Council is as broad as the cases say, and the
intent of the Administrative Procedure Act is to apply to administrative agencies,
the incorporation of Council activities into the Act is a non sequitur. In a sen-
tence, when the plain meaning of a statute leads to an absurd result, the courts
follow the statutory purpose rather than the literal words. United States v.
Am. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940). See BODENHEIMER, JURIS-
PPRUDENCE, 362-364 (1967). In this instance that means that the Act is inapplica-
ble to the Council.
28 Hearings on S. 1379 and H.R. 7417. Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary
Columbia, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 19 (1968) [Hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
29 1968 Hearings 1, 36.
30 Supra, note 27.
31 See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 537, APPENDIX 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3-108, 3-116,
3-202, 3-204, 3-205, 4-134, 4-134(a), 4-144 (1967).
32 82 Stat. 1203 (1968). 1 D.C. CODE H§ 1501, 1502, 1503, 1505, 1506, 1509
1510 (Supp. III 1970).
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gleaned from the D.C. Act, with a view toward its application, it fol-
lows that the A.P.A. applies to the Council in its administrative ca-
pacity, and to the same in its several administrative functions woven
into its legislative process.
B.
Now that we have concluded that the Act applies, "what changes
will the various sections of the Act force upon the Council when it
acts legislatively?" Section 4, in broad terms, 33 directs the Council to
abide by the Act's minimum procedures. What those procedures are
is intelligible only after reading all of the sections of the Act.
Sections 9, 10 and 11 appear to have no application to the
Council because these sections regulate activities which are incom-
patible with the Council's legislative functions. 4 Section 6 and parts
of Sections 7 and 8, which will be discussed later, are the only perti-
nent ones.
Section 6 requires the Council to publish its regulations before
they can become effective, to afford interested parties a hearing, and
lastly, limits the lifetime of emergency regulations.35 When this sec-
tion is compared with the existing "Rules of Procedure of the District
of Columbia Council,""a the only noticeable difference is the notice
requirements and the life span for emergency measures." In all
other areas, the Council rules are more detailed and comprehensive.
In fact, one could say that Section 6 changes little, if anything. It
simply compliments existing rules: confirming the fact that the pub-
lic can be a part of the legislative process (knowing, for example,
what and how regulations affect them, and their life span).
Suppose, for the moment, some citizen wants to challenge a Coun-
cil regulation, either by participating in the formulative process, or
subjecting the new rule to judicial review. In doing either of these
things, it is imperative that he knows how the regulation is to come
into being, by what authority, and its nature. Will the regulation be
a subordinate rule, promulgated pursuant to authority conferred upon
the Council by an act of Congress, or a rule enacted pursuant to the
33 1 D.C. CODE 1503 (Supp. M 1970).
34 1 D.C. CODE 1508, 1509 and 1510 (Supp. I1 1970).
35 1 D.C. CODE 1505 (Supp. III 1970).
36 Compare D.C. Council Res. No. 70-84 (January 20, 1970) with 1 D.C. CODE
1503, 1505 and 1506 (Supp. II 1970).
'4 1 D.C. CODE 1506(a) and (c) (Supp. III 1970).
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1-226 power possessed by the Council? Does the regulation pertain
to an activity which is beyond the scope of its delegated authority?
Will citizens of the District have an opportunity, by right, to air their
views prior to the time the rule is passed, and, if so, in what form?
All of these questions must be dealt with first before a chal-
lenger can proceed against a regulation. If he is going to be effec-
tive before a regulation is passed, he must know the forums available
to him where he can state his objections to the proposed law, or try to
persuade others to change their views on it. If, on the other hand, the
challenger's interests lie with judicial review, he should be in a posi-
tion to discuss the regulation in relation to Congressional or Council
enactments, and be able to say, with some confidence, that this regu-
lation goes beyond the pale authorized by statute.
Let us suppose, for the moment, that a Council regulation is
contested; that the D.C. Court of Appeals has handed down a deci-
sion to the effect that the legislative function exercised by the Council
is beyond the scope of the A.P.A. What effect would such a decision
have on Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Act?
Sections 5, 7 and 8, in substance, impose a duty upon the Com-
missioner to compile, index and publish regulations filed in his office
by his administrative agents and the City Council. 8 If Section 5 is
read very carefully, one discovers that this section is devoted entirely
to the duty imposed upon the Commissioner to publish regulations
under the Act. 9 There is no mention of the City Council. In view
38 1 D.C. CODE 1504, 1506 and 1507 (Supp. III 1970).
39 "Sec. 5. (a) The Commissioner shall publish at regular intervals not
less frequently than once every two weeks a bulletin to be known as the 'District of
Columbia Register,' in which shall be set forth the full text of all rules filed in
the Office of the Commissioner during the period covered by each issue of such
bulletin, except that the Commissioner may in his discretion omit from the Dis-
trict of Columbia Register rules the publication of which would be unduly cumber-
some, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient, if, in lieu of such publication, there is
included in the Register a notice stating the general subject matter of any rule so
omitted and stating the manner in which a copy of such rule may be obtained.
"(b) All courts within the District shall take judicial notice of rules published
or of which notice is given in the District of Columbia Register pursuant to
this section.
"(c) Publication in the District of Columbia Register of rules adopted,
amended, or repealed by the Commissioner or Council or by any agency shall not
be considered as a substitute for publication in one or more newspapers of general
circulation when such publication is required by statute.
"(d) The Commissioner is authorized to publish in the District of Columbia
Register, in addition to rules published under authority contained in subsection (a)
of this section, (1) cumulative indexed to regulations which have been adopted,
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of the above, bearing in mind the legislative intent of the Act, a court
decision affirming the position of the Council on its legislative au-
thority would have no effect on Section 5. The same result would
generally obtain under Sections 7 and 8, because both sections are
substantially devoted to the duties assumed by the Commissioner un-
der the Act.4"
There are, however, two exceptions-subsections 7 (c) and 8 (c).
These subsections provide: 4 '
"Sec. 7. * * *
(c) Except in the case of emergency rules, each rule adopted
after the effective date of this Act by the Commissioner or Coun-
cil or by an agency, shall be filed in the office of the Commis-
sioner. No such rule shall become effective until after its pub-
lication in the District of Columbia Register, nor shall such rule
become effective if it is required by law, other than this Act, to
be otherwise published, until such rule is also published as
required in such law."
"Sec. 8. * * *
(c) The Commissioner must publish the first compilation re-
quired by subsection (a) of this section within one year after
the effective date of this Act and no rule adopted by the Com-
missioner or by the Council or by any agency before the date of
such first publication which has not been filed and published
in accordance with this Act and which is not set forth in such
compilation shall be in effect after one year after the effective
date of this Act."
amended, or repealed; (2) information on changes in the organization of the
District government; (3) notices of public hearings; (4) codifications of rules; and
(5) such other matters as the Commissioner may from time to time determine to
be of general public interest." 1 D.C. CODE 1504 (Supp. III 1970).
40 "Sec. 7(a) Each agency, within thirty days after the effective date of
this Act, shall file with the Commissioner a certified copy of all of its rules in
force on such effective date.
"(b) The Commissioner shall keep a permanent register, open to public
inspection of all rules."
"Sec. 8. (a) As soon as practicable after the effective date of this Act, the
Commissioner shall have compiled, indexed, and published in the District of Colum-
bia Register all rules adopted by the Commissioner and Council and each agency
and in effect at the time of such compilation. Such compilations shall be promptly
supplemented or revised as may be necessary to reflect new rules and changes in
rules.
"(b) Compilations shall be made available to the public at a price fixed by
the Commissioner." 82 Stat. 1207 (1968). 1 D.C. CODE §§ 1506, 1507 (Supp. Ill
1970).
41 1 D.C. CODE §§ 1506(c) 1507(c) (Supp. I1 1970).
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If the court took the position that the Council's legislative func-
tion was beyond the scope of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act,
subsections 7(c) and 8(c), as they relate to the Council, would have
to be amended so as to exclude the Council, and any regulations en-
acted inconsistent with the 8(c) requirement would retain its force
and effect as law.42
Endemic to these subsections is an idea that the City Council's
activities are administrative in nature, and therefore, subject to an
administrative process.43 Looking at a Court of Appeals decision
from the point of view of causes and effects, any court decision put-
ting the Council's regulatory authority beyond the scope of the A.P.A.
would undermine the idea upon which subsections 7(c) and 8(c)
were written, and undermine the intent of the Act. More fundamen-
tally, such court decision would raise a very serious question, namely,
"whether the decision, overlooking the intent of the legislature, was a
form of judicial legislation prohibited by law?"
If confronted with such a question, the answer would have to be
yes. A fundamental principle of law, scrupulously observed by the
courts, is that the judiciary may not encroach upon the functions of
the legislature,4 4 or usurp its powers. Arguably, a court decision, as
described above, would usurp the legislative power exercised by Con-
gress over the District of Columbia, for Congress has put the func-
tions of the Council under the Administrative Procedure Act and a
court has taken them out.
45
Sections 7(c) and 8(c), when read together with the entire
Administrative Procedure Act, suggest that the Council's activities are
within the ambit of the Act. It follows, therefore, that until such time
as Congress declares the Council's authority to be beyond the scope of
the Act, a court decision saying that it is otherwise would raise the
specter of inappropriate judicial interference with the legislative
process.
42 Obviously any regulation enacted inconsistent with the A.P.A. would re-
tain its force and effect as law, since a court decision affirming the claim of the
Council would place the regulatory power exercised by the Council beyond the
scope of the Act. If, on the other hand, the court ruled against the claim, any un-
published regulation, which remained unpublished, would, at the end of one year
from the date the Act took effect, be void. 1 D.C. CODE 1507(c) (Supp. III 1970).
43 See 1968 Hearings 1, 36, 56 and 57.
44 United States v. First National Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 260 (1913). See CAR-
DOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 14-16 (1921); Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 402 (1908).




Let us now examine the D.C. Parole Board. The best way to
proceed is to take an actual case, and put it through the administra-
tive process.
Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as "Sam," was convicted of lar-
ceny and housebreaking and sentenced by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, on October 28, 1955, to a term of
four (4) to thirteen (13) years. He was conditionally released from
Lorton Reformatory on April 14, 1964. Prior to his release, Sam
informed the institution parole staff that the Parole Board had no au-
thority over him.
On April 24, 1964, a violation warrant was issued for the re-
leased prisoner because of his failure to report to the parole office, as
was customary. The warrant, however, was never executed because
Sam's whereabouts were unknown. He remained at large until he
was arrested in Montana. Thereupon, after it became known that he
was wanted as a conditional release violator, he was taken into cus-
tody by the U.S. Marshal and returned to Lorton on June 13, 1968.
On July 31, 1968, he appeared before the D.C. Parole Board for
hearing concerning the possible revocation of his conditional release.
He asked the Board, at that time, to appoint counsel for him
which the Board, by law, was not required to do. The Board, how-
ever, acceded to Sam's request by continuing his case so as to allow him
to obtain counsel (about which there is some dispute) to represent
him at the revocation hearing.
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals following a
proceeding before the U.S. District Court, Sam complained: that he
was denied the right to counsel in that the Parole Board refused to
appoint counsel to represent his interest at the revocation hearing;
that the Board had no authority to supervise his conduct after his
release from Lorton Reformatory due to the fact that his release was
unconditional and not parole; and that the Board improperly trans-
ported him from California to Lorton Reformatory after arresting
him on a violator's warrant which took four (4) years to execute.
The Court of Appeals reluctantly decided not to rule on the
complaint, primarily because the record lacked statements of fact suf-
ficient to execute a well-reasoned decision. Accordingly, the court re-
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manded the record, in October, 1969, to the U.S. District Court for
an evidentiary hearing on the following questions:
1. Whether the four (4) year's delay in executing the parole
violator warrant was reasonable-in this connection, the
steps taken by the United States to execute the warrant.
2. What conditions of release Sam was specifically informed of
at the time of his release in April, 1964.
3. Whether Sam's efforts to obtain counsel were, in connec-
tion with Board hearings, obstructed by persons in authority.
4. Whether the Board of Parole considered the possibility of
modifying the terms and conditions of Sam's parole, as pro-
vided for under 24 D.C. Code § 206 (1967 ed.), instead of
acting as it did in terminating Plaintiffs parole and reinstat-
ing the remainder of original sentence; and, if the Board did
consider such alternatives, what reasons were advanced to
support its decision to reject them.
The above facts put into question the applicability of the
D.C. A.P.A. On the facts, we are faced with "whether the ques-
tions remanded to the U.S. District Court were ones to be entertained
by it in view of the fact that the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act
(in operation at the time of the remand order) provides that jurisdic-
tion over 'contgsted cases' resides with the D.C. Court of Appeals;
. . . whether the D.C. Parole Board comes within the ambit of the
Act;" and, "if so, whether 'contested cases' are reviewed under the
Act by D.C. Court of Appeals where the Board is a party?"
Let us proceed by delving into the history behind and the func-
tions of the Parole Board. All evidence points to the conclusion that
the D.C. Parole Board comes within the ambit of the Act.
An agency, for the purpose of this article, is any delegatee who
or which has power to determine either by rule or decision, private
rights and obligations of others.4" The D.C. Parole Board fits
well into this definition, and may properly be regarded as an agency,
in view of the fact that it is a delegate with the power to determine,
by decision, the rights of others. 7
In March, 1875, Congress enacted a law (as amended in 1902)
which provided that persons convicted of any offense against the
46 REPORT, COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FOR THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1941).
47 See Fleming v. Ttate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
HOWARD LAW JOURNAL
United States, and sentenced for a definite period of time, other than
life were entitled to a reduction in sentence. 48  Subsequent thereto,
in 1910, Congress enacted a statute, consistent with the above, creat-
ing a Federal parole agency whose functions were, among others, to
release prisoners before the end of their sentence and supervise their
conduct following a showing that there was a reasonable possibility
that such persons would live and remain at liberty without violating
the law.49
These functions were transferred in 1932 to a D.C. Parole
Board whose jurisdiction extended over all persons confined to penal
institutions of the District of Columbia. 50  In addition, by statute,
the Board was given the power to adopt rules and regulations for its
activities, subject to the Commissioner's approval,"' and the power to
conduct hearings concerning parolees (which activity is also subject,
in part, to the Commissioner's supervision).52
In view of the above, the question which necessarily arises "is
whether the D.C. Parole Board is, in light of its history and func-
tions, an agency within the meaning of the D.C. Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, and thereby, subject to it?" The answer is yes. The
history behind the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that Con-
gress was desirous of subjecting the 93 administrative agencies, within
the District Government, to a uniform administrative law.5 To carry
out its desire, Congress directed the Mayor-Commissioner, through a
D.C. Administrative Procedure Act, to establish formal and informal
procedures, consistent with the Act's minimum procedures, which all
agencies under the Commissioner were required to follow.
The Act in pertinent part provides:
54
A 'subordinate agency' means any * * * board required by
law or by the Commissioner or the Council to administer any
law or any rule adopted under the authority of law.
To date all subordinate agencies, within the meaning of the
above definition, are subject to the Act. In our case, the D.C. Parole
Board is a subordinate agency and one, it would seem, which is
48 Gould v. Green, 141 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
49 Id.
r0 24 D.C. CODE §§ 201, 201(a) (1967).
51 Id.
52 24 D.C. CODE §§ 204(b) (1967).
53 1968 Hearings 1, 36.
54 1 D.C. CODE § 1502(4) (Supp. III 1970).
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subject to the Act.
55
By examining the Board's function one finds that they are, com-
paratively speaking, compatible with the above definition. The Board
makes and administers rules required by law subject to the direction
and control of the Commissioner, as well as the law governing the
affairs of persons incarcerated in D.C. penal institutions.
56 Besides,
the Act's legislative history indicates that no agency or agency ac-
tivity, with few exceptions, 5 7 is excluded from its coverage.
Considering the above-namely, that the D.C. Parole Board is
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, and that one of its pro-
visions provides that disputes, involving agencies under it, are re-
viewable by the D.C. Court of Appeals 5 -- it follows that disputes
involving the Parole Board are reviewable by the same D.C. Court
of Appeals. Further, that the U.S. Court of Appeals should not, in
light of the applicability of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act,
remand questions, for an evidentiary hearing, to the U.S. District
Court.
Assuming now that the Act applies, "Is the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals the forum before which the remanded questions can best be
answered?" The D.C. Administrative Procedure Act is silent on the
question, and there is nothing in the pertinent legislative history be-
hind the Act to guide us. Possibly, because the questions remanded
are trial-type in nature and because the D.C. A.P.A. is silent on what
to do with such questions, the better course would be to leave the
questions with the U.S. District Court. If we take into account, for
the moment, the fact that the Act took effect after Sam's action com-
55 Our Board is subject to the control of the Commissioner. Supra, notes 53 and
55.
On the same point: In contrast with the position taken in the body of this
paper is the view, held by some, that the D.C. Parole Board is not subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act. The functions and responsibilities of the Federal and
D.C. Parole Boards are much alike, except for the fact that the Federal Board is
not subject to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225 (D.C. Cir. 1963). By analogy, if the Federal Parole Board is not subject to
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, the D.C. Parole Board should not be
subject to the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act.
This line of reasoning, however, ignores the dynamics of what takes place in a
hearing to determine the desirability of revoking a person's parole. Hyser v. Reed,
supra at 248-252, Judge Bazelon dissenting. It is to the procedure for making bind-
ing determinations that the Act relates and should be made applicable. As yet
no court has said that the Act applies.
56 24 D.C. CODE 201, 201(a), 204 (1967).
57 S. REP. No. 1581, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1968).
59 1 D.C. CODE 1510 (Supp. 111 1970) .
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menced and in the interim between the proceedings before the Dis-
trict Court and the one before the U.S. Court of Appeals, more con-
fusion not less, would be created by now applying the Act. In sum-
mary, unless there is a showing (in the facts of this case) that a
party's or parties' rights would somehow be impaired by a failure to
execute the Act, there is no need to apply it.59
To resolve any doubt, let us now examine the remanded ques-
tions to see what is involved and who could possibly be prejudiced if
the D.C. Act is ignored: the first question goes to what, administra-
tively speaking, was done to execute the warrant. The second goes
to whether the Parole Board had jurisdiction to act; the third question
goes to a denial of the right to counsel; and the fourth goes to the
machinations of the administrators in arriving at their decision to re-
voke plaintiffs parole. There appears to be, from this examination,
two administrative and two constitutional questions. In effect, we
are confronted with substantial constitutional law/fact questions
which are, ordinarily, entertained by a trial court in a de novo pro-
ceeding.
A de novo proceeding is one in which a trial court takes a case,
previously before an administrative body and retries it in its en-
tirety."0 Such trials are warranted only when a constitutional right is
involved or an agency has acted beyond its statutory powers,," as
for example, when the D.C. Parole Board convenes a hearing in the
absence of establishing the jurisdictional fact (that there has been a
violation of prisoner's parole) upon which all its hearings are based.
6 2
In our case, it appears that the D.C. Board was advised of plain-
tiff's parole violation by his parole officer, and that plaintiffs claim
to the right of counsel, in the context of proceedings before the Parole
Board, was statutory and not constitutional. 6' Because of these facts,
bearing in mind the basis for the convocation of a de novo hearing,
plaintiff, as far as the Board is concerned, was not entitled to have
the remanded question answered before the U.S. District Court. The
court, without ample justification (in the event the questions are re-
manded to it) would wrongfully interfere with statutory powers exer-
59 See CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 286 (1940).
60 FoRiosCm, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 342, 343, 345 (1956).
61 Id. at §§ 342, 343.
62 24 D.C. CODE §§ 205, 206 (1967).
63 In re Tate, 63 F. Supp. 961, 964 (D.C. D.C. 1961).
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cised by an administrative agency.
It would seem to follow that because the questions remanded
are not ones for a de novo type hearing and because the statu-
tory powers of D.C. Parole Board would be improperly inter-
fered with, the remanded questions should be referred to the D.C.
Court of Appeals, which under the Act and consistent with it, would
properly dispose of them.
B.
This kind of analysis, employed in the above case, should be used
whenever one is confronted with the application of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act to District agencies, for local Government yields
only grudgingly to new forms and legal practices.
CONCLUSION
As it now stands: administrative law, on a local level, is virgin
territory in the District of Columbia. It remains for us, the legal
practitioners, to see that the recent enactment on the subject is im-
plemeted vigorously so as to assure that the ideal of administrative due
process becomes a reality for every citizen.
